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expect about the correctness of that conception. If we take Jeffrey’s advice, 
won’t we be “creat[ing] even more silos within philosophy of religion” 
(65)? Jeffrey thinks not. If the danger with silos is that they isolate us from 
one another, how much more isolating to converse with religious others 
without owning up to what either of us really believe, outside the philos-
ophy room? Interreligious understanding seems likelier to come from a 
fusion of horizons than from an attempt to say as little as possible.
I concur with Jeffrey about this almost entirely. Almost. Reading the 
closing pages of this closely argued book, I  found myself thinking of 
C.S. Lewis’s famous image of different (Christian) traditions as rooms in 
a boarding house. The “mere Christianity” of his title he likened to the 
main hall, off which the rooms open. “But it is in the rooms,” he writes, 
“not the hall, that there are fires and chairs and meals.” Sage words. And 
yet: there was a point too in his writing a book titled Mere Christianity. As 
there might be a point in books and articles about “mere theism.” If it can 
be clarifying and instructive for believers to explore the ways in which 
they are different, it can be equally clarifying and instructive for them to 
explore the ways in which they are the same.
Jeffrey has done her peers a service in writing this book, which must 
have been demanding to compose. It’s not something everyone needs to 
read. But I don’t think there’s anything quite like it on the market. If you 
need what it offers, you’ll be glad to have it on your shelf.
(Thanks to the students in Houghton College’s spring philosophy 
colloquium—Anna Judd, Aaron Moore, Anna Nesemeier, Tyler Stetson, 
Elijah Tangenberg, Honus Wagner, and Josiah Wiedenheft—for reading 
and discussing Jeffrey’s book, and a draft of this review, with me. Thanks 
to Kyla Ebels-Duggan for helpful discussion about her argument in “The 
Right, the Good, and the Threat of Despair.”)
Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment, by John Pittard. Oxford 
University Press, 2020. Pp xiii + 339. $80 (hardcover).
KIRK LOUGHEED, The University of Johannesburg.
John Pittard’s book, Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment 
marks a significant contribution to both epistemology and the philosophy 
of religion. The book is excellent and those working in these fields would 
do well to engage with it. The problem Pittard addresses is that of religious 
disagreement: Suppose Sally believes some religious proposition, say, that 
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God exists. Let’s call this proposition p. Further suppose that Sally becomes 
aware that an epistemic peer, Bill, disagrees with her and believes not-p. 
According to Pittard, we can say that “two people qualify as epistemic 
peers with respect to p just in case their epistemic credentials with respect 
to p are equally strong” (25). What is the epistemic significance of the dis-
agreement between Sally and Bill? Does peer disagreement constitute a 
(partial) defeater for each of their respective beliefs?
Non-conciliationists say that Sally is justified in remaining steadfast 
in the face of disagreement. Conciliationists, on the other hand, recom-
mend that Sally revise her religious belief p in the face of disagreement. 
Strong conciliationists say that Sally must lower her confidence in p below 
whatever threshold is required for rational belief. Of course, if strong concilia-
tionism is true, then given the existence of widespread religious disagree-
ment, a serious sceptical challenge to religious belief is on offer. Pittard 
defends what he refers to as weak conciliationism. This position recom-
mends belief revision in certain cases of disagreement, but not in others. 
We might think of Pittard’s view as a hybrid between strong non-con-
ciliationism, which recommends never revising, and strong conciliation-
ism, which has opponents always revise. To my mind Pittard offers us 
the most plausible hybrid theory currently found in the epistemology of 
disagreement.
In Chapter One Pittard carefully outlines the challenge to the ration-
ality of religious belief posed by the existence of peer disagreement. Of 
course, one way for Sally to evade this argument is to show that she is 
more reliable with respect to p than her opponent Bill. While Pittard 
thinks Sally needs good internal reasons for believing this she also needs 
good agent-neutral internal reasons (the “Agent Impartiality Constraint”), 
and good dispute independent agent-neutral internal reasons (the “Reasons 
Impartiality Constraint”) (46).
In Chapter Two Pittard takes on the Reasons Impartiality Constraint. 
His two foils are David Christensen and J.L. Schellenberg. Christensen is 
the foremost defender of the idea that Sally must have dispute-independent 
reasons for thinking she is more reliable about p than Bill. I won’t outline 
what Pittard says about Christensen and independence, though concilia-
tionists would do well to reflect on this section. Schellenberg writes in the 
context of inquiry, addressing which sort of doxastic practices inquirers 
should place their presumptive trust in. According to Schellenberg mys-
tical experiences are not one such practice. Schellenberg advocates for 
doxastic minimalism according to which “the only practices that should be 
treated as “innocent until proven guilty” are those that are both universal 
among human beings (or at least nearly so) and unavoidable. Any other 
doxastic practice must be shown to be reliable before it is rational to rely 
on it” (72). We also need to grant a presumptive trust to these practices 
in order to avoid widespread scepticism. Of course, the doxastic prac-
tices that someone like Sally uses to form her religious beliefs are neither 
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universal nor unavoidable. She also doesn’t need to rely on these practices 
to avoid scepticism.
One criticism that Pittard levels against Schellenberg’s argument is that 
it focuses exclusively on avoiding error but not on arriving at the truth. 
It is well known that William James argued that inquirers often have to 
balance the two sometimes conflicting goals of avoiding error and gaining 
truth (82). Pittard says that “it should not be assumed that the investigator 
who is concerned for the truth will remain agnostic on some question any-
time the evidence is less than fully conclusive” (83). According to Pittard 
if someone values the truth then she is perfectly entitled to use non-ba-
sic doxastic practices (even though this increases the possibility of error). 
According to Pittard “[i]n holding that the committed investigator will (as 
far as possible) be a doxastic minimalist, Schellenberg presupposes with-
out argument that the aim of error avoidance always trumps the aim of 
believing the truth” (83).
It’s not clear to me why Pittard claims Schellenberg’s doxastic min-
imalism does not care about gaining true beliefs. It seems to me that it 
actually perfectly balances the two competing epistemic goals in ques-
tion. The doxastic practices that are granted a presumptive trust are, 
after all, used to gain true beliefs. Pittard seems to think Schellenberg’s 
account is too narrow and restrictive. But in arguing for a more per-
missive stance toward non-basic doxastic practices Pittard risks being 
overly permissive. His objective, of course, is to show that religious 
experience (and doxastic religious practises in general) are trustworthy 
and hence dispute-independent reasons aren’t required as a legitimate 
tiebreaker in religious disputes. But he never tells us where to draw the 
line. Ingesting a large quantity of a hallucinogenic drug is a doxastic 
practice. It will in all likelihood cause the user to form a number of dif-
ferent beliefs. But this isn’t a reliable doxastic practice. Schellenberg’s 
account tells us why this is so, while Pittard’s criticisms leaves the 
reader wondering.
So in Chapters One and Two Pittard explains the problem of disagree-
ment and challenges some of the assumptions he thinks are required for 
strong conciliationism to succeed. But what is Pittard’s own view about 
how we should respond to disagreement? In Chapters Three, Four, and 
Five he defends his own weak conciliatory position. These are the three 
most important chapters of the book and they mark a significant con-
tribution to the current literature on disagreement. Suppose Sally and 
Bill each possess different thermometers that are typically (and indeed 
equally) reliable. But one day Sally’s thermometer reads 20 degrees and 
Bill’s reads 17 degrees. In such a scenario there is no principled reason 
to trust one of the thermometers over the other. This picture is meant to 
support a particularly strong conciliatory view known as the equal weight 
view. Sally and Bill should give equal weight to each of the readouts and 
in this case they should probably suspend judgment altogether (95). Of 
course, proponents of the equal weight view will say that with respect to 
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their religious dispute, the respective judgments of Sally and Bill should 
each be understood as different readouts on a thermometer. If this analogy 
holds, then the equal weight view applies in religious disputes like the 
one between Sally and Bill.
I must pause to say that while Pittard nicely motivates the equal weight 
view by explaining the position of those who motivate it with thermometer 
analogies it’s somewhat glaring he never mentions the work of Jonathan 
Matheson. This is because Matheson has extensively defended the equal 
weight view in a series of articles, but more importantly Matheson is 
the only one who offers a book-length defense of it in his The Epistemic 
Significance of Disagreement (Palgrave MacMillan, 2015). Matheson uses the 
idea of an epistemic election rather than thermometer to motivate his ver-
sion of the equal weight view. Even if interacting with Matheson’s view 
would not ultimately change Pittard’s discussion, he should explain this 
to the reader. Otherwise we’re left wondering why Matheson is missing 
from the discussion.
Pittard notes that the initial credence or confidence that Sally places in 
her religious belief must be accurate in order for her to accurately condi-
tionalize on Bill’s opposing belief (99). He argues “that instrumentalism 
[i.e. treating beliefs as thermometers” readings] (together with condition-
alization) rationalizes demanding conciliatory requirements in superficial 
but not in fundamental disagreement” (101). I  must admit, I  was quite 
sceptical at this point about the prospects of Pittard being able to distin-
guish between superficial and fundamental disagreements (at least in a 
principled way). However, I’m glad to say that Pittard more than satisfies 
my initial scepticism.
The degree to which someone like Sally should trust her cognitive fac-
ulties depends on (1) her assessment of cognitive reliability, but also (2) 
her prior credence in the proposition in question (102). Pittard is right that 
this second condition is simply left out of current discussions and he’s 
also right that it matters quite a lot. He says that Sally has “more reason 
to trust readouts that support a proposition that is antecedently probable 
than readouts that support a proposition that is antecedently improbable” 
(102). He explains:
The equal weight view is often described as requiring one to “split the dif-
ference” with epistemic peers by adopting a credence halfway between the 
two predisagreement credences. But splitting the difference generally does 
not accord with how epistemic peers treat discrepancies between equally 
reliable instruments. Splitting the difference in a peer disagreement is a 
reasonable response that accords with instrumentalism only in the special 
circumstances where one’s prior credence distribution favors neither one’s 
own view nor the view of one’s peer (105).
It’s true that this could simply be a friendly amendment to the equal 
weight view. Maybe Sally and Bill should also give equal weight to each 
of their prior credences (106). But Pittard contends that:
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[T]here are some attitudes that cannot be treated in an instrumentalist 
way at all. In particular, I  am unable to adopt an instrumentalist view of 
my most fundamental rational starting points. Adopting an instrumentalist 
attitude toward some doxastic attitude or inclination involves treating that 
attitude or inclination as a “readout” of a complicated instrument and then 
conditionalizing on that readout evidence from an antecedent perspective 
that is not itself informed by the readout. So this process requires that I have 
some antecedent perspective that is not informed by the very readout being 
treated instrumentally. But if the “readout” in question is my most funda-
mental attitude regarding the plausibility of p, what Bayesian sometimes 
refer to as my “ur-prior” for p, then clearly I have no perspective on p that is 
antecedent to the readout (108).
While this may not pose a problem for thermometers when there’s 
always a clear prior credence, when it comes to the instruments of our 
heads things are much less clear (108). For some of the readouts are them-
selves antecedent expectations and hence instrumentalism doesn’t apply 
to our most fundamental attitudes (108). Pittard explains that “if I disa-
gree with you about the fundamental plausibility of p, so that we have two 
different ur-priors for p, I cannot treat both of these ur-priors in a purely 
instrumentalist way” (109) One’s ur-priors cannot always be judged inde-
pendently of disputes about them (as strong conciliationism demands) 
(111). The weak conciliationism Pittard defends just requires condition-
alizing on outputs (not the antecedent priors) and hence in certain cases 
the type of revision required will be much less demanding than strong 
conciliationism.
An absolutely brilliant part of Pittard’s view here is that he can explain 
the intuitive results that we should revise in very simple cases: imagine 
Sally and Bill just disagree about how much each of them owe on a restau-
rant bill when they’ve both done the calculation in their heads. If Sally and 
Bill are equally reliable about mental math, then their ur-priors should be 
identical (neither has a reason to favour their own). Pittard’s distinction 
between antecedent priors and the outputs (i.e. the thermometer read-
ing) genuinely gets the right result in these simple cases without neces-
sarily committing him to revision in more complicated cases (i.e., cases 
of religious disagreement). That Pittard gets the right results here (in a 
principled way) is part of the reason why I think he has offered the most 
successful hybrid theory to date. I really hope that epistemologists explore 
Pittard’s work in this part of the book.
Of course, at this point we still don’t have a solution to religious disa-
greement. However, Pittard explains that “a substantial portion of one’s 
ur-priors may enjoy some degree of partisan justification” (118). Partisan 
justification amounts to reasons that any neutral third-party would 
accept. The question, then, is whether someone like Sally can have par-
tisan justification about her religious beliefs. Pittard’s preferred account 
of partisan justification says that it “is grounded in rational insight and 
is not available in disagreements with acknowledged rationality parity” 
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(141–142). Pittard also says that “according to a rationalist account of par-
tisan justification, a self-favoring (readout) reliability estimate can be jus-
tified in virtue of having rational insight into the truth or plausibility of 
one’s outlook” (168). Finally, he also explains that “for insight to ground 
partisan justification, that insight must help supply an all-things-consid-
ered reason for thinking that one’s own outlook is rationally stronger than 
the outlooks of one’s disputants” (168). So now the question is whether 
someone like Sally could have the right kind of religious insight that’s 
required on this account.
Pittard ultimately labels his position rationalist weak conciliationism 
which says that “confident religious belief is likely [to] be justified only to 
the extent that one has insight that justifies thinking that one’s own reli-
gious outlook is rationally stronger (in a way that one can discern) than the 
outlook of one’s disputants” (183). Pittard is not just endorsing a type of 
rationalism that only the sophisticated religious believer can possess. He 
endorses a type of affective rationalism such that emotional experiences can 
contribute to genuine religious insight (182). Pittard does not claim that 
every apparent religious insight is in fact genuine. He also doesn’t claim 
that revision is never required in cases of religious disagreement. The key 
is that if Sally’s ur-prior about p is based on a genuine religious insight 
then she needs to revise her belief that p by conditionalizing on Bill’s belief 
but also on her ur-prior. While sometimes this will still require significant 
revision at the level of the religious belief (i.e., the output), other times 
it won’t. If Sally’s ur-prior is higher than Bill’s ur-prior, the type of revi-
sion she is required to make will be significantly less than that typically 
required by the equal weight view. We now have a partial solution to reli-
gious disagreement which is precisely what Pittard promises us. Chapters 
Six and Seven discuss the implications of religious disagreement if it turns 
out that Pittard’s rational weak conciliationism is mistaken. This is a nice 
feature of the book as it will engage with readers who haven’t necessarily 
bought what Pittard has been selling.
Given space constraints this review is, sadly, much less fine-grained 
than what is found in the book. I close by noting that Pittard is a sensitive 
philosopher. By this I mean that he is sensitive to not only the demerits 
of views that oppose his own, but also the merits of them. Likewise, he’s 
sensitive about the scope of his own views and never tries to overreach 
in his conclusions. To say that this is a book in religious epistemology is 
slightly misleading. For this book is, I think, required reading for any epis-
temologist working on disagreement. Likewise, given the sceptical threat 
to religious belief posed by conciliationism I also think that this book is 
required reading for the philosopher of religion. To genuinely engage two 
subdisciplines in philosophy in one unified project is an impressive feat in 
itself. My sense is that Disagreement, Deference, and Religious Commitment is 
just the beginning for Pittard. I highly recommend it and I look forward to 
reading more of his work.
